（漢字谷歌翻譯，原文於下）
大英百科全書：蔣介石
到1949年，蔣介石失去了中共大陸，中華人民共和國成立。蔣介石與民族主義軍隊的遺體一起搬到台灣，與其他民族主義領袖建立了比較好的獨裁獨裁，試圖騷擾整個台海兩岸的共產黨人。蔣介石改革了一度腐敗的民族主義政黨的隊伍，在美國慷慨援助的幫助下，他在接下來的二十年中，在台灣走上了現代經濟發展的道路上取得成功。
1955年，美國與蔣介石在台灣國民政府簽署了一項協議，保證了防務。
然而，從1972年開始，美國和中華人民共和國日益加強的和解，這個協議的價值和蔣介石政府的未來受到嚴重的質疑。蔣介石沒有看到美國在1979年終於與台灣建立外交關係，以建立與中華人民共和國的全面關係。一九七五年他去世後，曾被蔣介石的兒子蔣經國取代，是由嚴家淦（C.K.
Yen）暫時接替的。
蔣介石被共產黨人推翻的原因之一，常常引用他所領導的政府中的腐敗。另一個原因是他在處理不斷變化的條件方面失去靈活性多年來，他的領導階層越來越僵硬，他對民眾情緒和新觀念的反應較少。他來自忠誠度超過能力，更多地依靠個人關係而不是組織關係。他對一個信任的集團的依賴也顯示在他的軍隊中，他啟用自己狹隘傳統的心腹團隊，而杜絕且打壓許多高能力者於門外。蔣介石始終堅持自己的立場為中國共和的首要領導人，精明地打倒省級軍閥和可能的民族對抗對手，後來他對美國軍政，外交和財政支持他的政權的培養。
共產黨人的推翻也許可以追溯到二戰期間的戰略;他一般拒絕用美軍裝備的軍隊，積極抵制中國的日本佔領者，而不是依靠美國，最終自己打敗日本。他選擇了保留他的軍事機器，直到在戰爭結束時在共產主義者身上釋放它們，然後一再粉碎他們。但是到目前為止，蔣介石的戰略已經退步了。他對日本人的被動立場失去了他們共產黨人最強烈反抗抵抗力獲得的中國民眾的聲望和支持。他們的軍隊士氣和效能在西南地區被強迫被動的時候已經衰落，共產黨人在呼籲中國民族主義情緒的同時，建起了大型的戰鬥硬化的軍隊。
最後，可以說，蔣介石“失去中國”是因為他把中國社會進入二十世紀所需要的深刻的社會和經濟變革沒有更高的遠景和連貫的計劃。 1927年他清理民族主義共產主義夥伴，隨後與地主和商業階級結盟，蔣介石越過保守的道路，幾乎無視中國被壓迫和貧困農民的困境。農民形成了近90％的中國人口，而且這是他們的支持，正如共產主義勝利所表明的那樣，這再次成立了一個能夠實現中國現代統一的強大的中央政府，這是至關重要的。
大英百科全書：蔣介石
… by 1949 Chiang had lost
continental China to the communists, and the People’s Republic of China was
established. Chiang moved to Taiwan with the remnants of his Nationalist
forces, established a relatively benign
dictatorship over the island with other Nationalist leaders, and attempted to
harass the communists across the Formosa Strait. The chastened Chiang reformed the ranks of
the once-corrupt Nationalist Party, and with the help of generous American aid
he succeeded in the next two decades in setting Taiwan on the road to modern
economic development. In 1955 the United
States signed an agreement with Chiang’s Nationalist government on Taiwan
guaranteeing its defense.
Beginning in 1972, however, the
value of this agreement and the future of Chiang’s government were seriously
called in question by the growing rapprochement between the United States and
the People’s Republic of China. Chiang
did not live to see the United States finally break diplomatic relations with Taiwan
in 1979 in order to establish full relations with the People’s Republic of
China. After his death in 1975 he was
succeeded temporarily by Yen Chia-kan (C.K. Yen), who was
in 1978 replaced by Chiang’s son Chiang Ching-kuo.
Among the reasons for Chiang’s
overthrow by the communists, one frequently cited is the corruption that he countenanced
in his government; another was his loss of flexibility in dealing with changing
conditions. Growing more rigid in his
leadership over the years, he became less responsive to popular sentiment and
to new ideas. He came to prize loyalty
more than competence and to rely more on personal ties than on ties of
organization. His dependence on a
trusted clique also showed in his army, in which he favoured narrow
traditionalists over many abler officers.
Chiang initially maintained his position as republican China’s paramount
leader by shrewdly playing off provincial warlords and possible Nationalist
rivals against each other and later by his adroit cultivation
of American military, diplomatic, and financial support for his regime.
His overthrow by the communists
can perhaps be traced to his strategy during World War II; he generally refused
to use his U.S.-equipped armies to actively resist China’s Japanese occupiers
and counted instead on the United States to eventually defeat Japan on its
own. He chose rather to preserve his
military machine until the time came to unleash it on the communists at the
war’s end and then crush them once and for all.
But by that point Chiang’s strategy had backfired; his passive stance
against the Japanese had lost him the prestige and
support among the Chinese populace that the communists ultimately gained by
their fierce anti-Japanese resistance.
The morale and effectiveness of his armies had decayed during their
enforced passivity in southwestern China, while the communists had built up
large, battle-hardened armies on the strength of their appeal to Chinese
nationalist sentiment.
Finally, it can be said that
Chiang “lost China” because he had no higher vision or coherent plan
for making the deep social and economic changes needed to bring Chinese society
into the 20th century. From his purge of the Nationalists’ communist partners
in 1927 and his subsequent alliance with the landowning and mercantile classes,
Chiang inexorably followed an increasingly conservative path that virtually
ignored the plight of China’s oppressed and impoverished peasantry. The
peasants formed almost 90 percent of China’s population, though, and it was
their support, as demonstrated by the communist victory, which proved crucial
in once more establishing a strong central government that could achieve the
modern unification of China.
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